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Lumber had been mysteriously disappearing from a Miami,
Florida, lumber company. A private detective agency was retained
to solve the crime. On the company premises was a shack, ordinarily
used as a place for painting company signs. In the latter part of
March 1947, it was employed for another purpose.
In the middle of the shack near a small desk was a chair upon
which a bright light was trained. One by one, the suspects-four
white employees-were taken into the shack and seated in the chair.
The grilling commenced, followed by denials. Then came the beat-
ings, with dowel sticks, fists, rubber hose. Each of the victims held
out as long as he could in his disclaimer of guilt. Finally, after hours
of torture and when he could abide the pain no longer, each "con-
fessed."
Four members of the detective agency were primarily responsible
for the brutality. The head of the detective agency (the protagonist)
and an associate were special Miami police officers. A member of the
Miami police force and the company comptroller also participated.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation learned what had happened
shortly after the incidents had taken place and promptly notified the
Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. As soon as it was
sufficiently established that officers acting under color of law were
involved and that the Department thus had jurisdiction, a thorough
investigation was instituted, which led, on October 22, 1948, to the
return of an eight-count indictment in the Southern District of Florida,
in which the individuals who had directly or indirectly taken part in
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the beatings were named as defendants.1 Two counts applied to the
incident involving each victim, one for the substantive offense 2 and
the other for a conspiracy under the civil rights conspiracy statute.8
The case came to trial on January 17, 1949, and the jury on
January 21, 1949, returned a guilty verdict on the substantive counts
against the head of the detective agency, who, as has been noted, was
also a special Miami police officer,4 but on those counts acquitted the
others. It was unable to reach an agreement as to any of the de-
fendants on the conspiracy counts, and on those a mistrial was de-
clared.
During the trial, all but one of the individual defendants had
testified under oath that there had not even been a beating. These
defendants were thereupon indicted for perjury.5
Convinced that the jury's inability to agree upon a verdict in
the case of the conspiracy counts in the first case merely reflected
failure to comprehend the legal requirements of conspiracy, the Gov-
ernment prosecutor again tried the conspiracy case, and on April 22,
1949, the jury returned a guilty verdict as to all the defendants."
1. This indictment was superseded about a month later by another indictment,
which included the company as a defendant. One individual defendant was omitted
from the superseding indictment since he had pleaded guilty to the substantive counts
of the first indictment; the conspiracy counts were nolle prossed as to him.
2. Under §20 of the Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. §52 (1946), now 18 U.S.C.
§ 242 (1948). In the § 52 counts the members of the detective agency and the
Miami policeman were named as principals, the company and the comptroller as
aiders and abettors.
3. Section 19 of the Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. § 51 (1946), now 18 U.S.C. § 241
(1948). Use of the civil rights conspiracy statute instead of the general conspiracy
statute (now 18 U.S.C. § 371) has been frequent in recent years, apparently re-
flecting a preference on the part of the Government for employment of a statute felt
to have been designed for the specific purpose. (That enforcement of the Fourteenth
Amendment was among the purposes of the civil rights conspiracy statute, see CONG.
GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d sess. 3611-13 (1870); FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FouR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT 225, 249; Rutledge, J., in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S.
91, 118-121 (1945).) However, the Williams case appears to be the first instance
of a conviction under §51 for police brutality. In his article, Unconstitutional
Acts as Federal Crimes, 60 HAmv. L. REv. 65, 93 (1946), Professor Hale appears
to chide the Department for not invoking § 51 in the Screws case. Actually, one
count in the indictment in the Screws case was under § 51. That count was dismissed
by the trial court without opinion. The Government went to trial on the remaining
counts under § 52 and the general conspiracy statute, then § 88. Violation of the
civil rights conspiracy statute is a felony. Since the 1948 revision of Title 18 of the
United States Code, a conspiracy under the general conspiracy statute (§ 371) to
violate the civil rights statute (§ 242) is a misdemeanor.
4. He received the maximum sentence under each of the four substantive counts,
totaling four years' imprisonment.
5. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1948).
6. The detective agency head received a two-year sentence, to run concurrently
with the first two years of his sentence in the substantive case. The other individuals,
in brief, received a year and a day sentence and three years' probation. The confine-
ment sentence against the comptroller was suspended. Each individual defendant
also was fined $100 which was remitted. The company was fined a total of $4,000.
The company also made a substantial settlement of civil claims which were made
against it.
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The appellate phases of the three cases then commenced. The
detective agency head appealed from the judgment in the substantive
case. All but two defendants 7 appealed from the conspiracy convic-
tion. On January 10, 1950, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit unanimously affirmed the judgment in the substantive case,' largely
upon the basis of Screws v. United States,' and reversed the judgment
in the conspiracy case, one judge dissenting.1" Subsequently, the
District Court dismissed the perjury indictment. 1
Petitions for writs of certiorari were filed with the Supreme Court
in the substantive case ' and in the conspiracy case,' and these have
been granted; and a notice of appeal was filed with the Court in the
perjury case, 14 and probable jurisdiction has been noted. The sordid
events which occurred in the lumber company's paint shack have thus
given rise to three cases which the Supreme Court will adjudicate.
THE CIVIL RIGHTS SECTION AND ITS STATUTORY WEAPONS
Behind the scenes of the Williams cases and all other civil rights
matters involving a possible violation of Federal law is a unit, little 15
7. The company and its comptroller.
8. Williams v. United States, 179 F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1950).
9. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
10. Williams et al. v. United States, 179 F.2d, 644 (5th Cir. 1950). The main
points of the court's decision were: (1) Section 51 (now §241) did not apply to
rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment because the statute protected only
those Federal rights "which appertain to citizens as such and not the general rights
extended to all persons by the [due process] clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
(2) Even if § 51 was intended to apply to rights secured by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, it would be unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment for failure to provide
a reasonably ascertainable standard of guilt, since the statute failed to require "will-
fulness," a deficiency which was not cured by the word "conspire." (3) Even if
§ 51 was not void for vagueness, the failure of the trial court to charge "willfulness"
as required by the Screws case constituted reversible error. (4) The meagerness of
the direct evidence of conspiracy made failure to admit evidence concerning the
previous acquittal for aiding and abetting the commission of the substantive offense
reversible error. judge Sibley wrote the opinion; a special concurring opinion was
written by judge Waller; and Judge Holmes wrote a dissenting opinion.
11. The Court held that the conviction of the detective agency head under § 52
barred a perjury prosecution against him on the ground that such a prosecution
would constitute double jeopardy and the acquittal of the three others indicted for
perjury constituted res judicata. It also held that in view of the reversal of the con-
spiracy conviction under § 51, in any event, the perjury charges could not lie. (The
Court's order is unreported.)
12. Williams v. United States, No. 365, Oct. Term 1950.
13. United States v. Williams et al., No. 26, Oct. Term 1950.
14. United States v. Williams et al., No. 134, Oct. Term 1950.
15. The Civil Rights Section at present has only seven attorneys. The staff
now is no larger than it was at its inception. See Washington Notes, New Republic,
Mar. 8, 1939, p. 128, col. 2. As pointed out in an editorial in the N.Y. Times, July
24, 1949, § 4, p. 6, col. 3, "** * The [Civil Rights] Section is so small that private
organizations in the civil rights field employ more people just to do their research."
The President's Committee on Civil Rights reported, "At the present time the Civil
Rights Section has a complement of seven lawyers * * *. This small staff is inade-
quate either for maximum enforcement of existing civil rights statutes, or for en-
forcement of additional legislation such as that recommended by this Committee."
To SEcuRE THESE RIGHTS: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMrITTEE ON CivIL RIGHTS
119-20 (1947).
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and little known, the Civil Rights Section of the Department of Justice,
which was created on February 3, 1939, as a part of the Department's
Criminal Division by the then Attorney General Frank Murphy. In
his order 1 establishing the Section it was stated:
The function and purpose of this unit will be to make a
study of the provisions of the Constitution of the United States
and Acts of Congress relating to civil rights with reference to
present conditions, to make appropriate recommendations in re-
spect thereto, and to direct, supervise and conduct prosecutions
of violations of the provisions of the Constitution or Acts of Con-
gress guaranteeing civil rights to individuals.
The Federal criminal laws with which the Section is primarily
concerned are the two statutes involved in the Williams cases, Sections
241 and 242 of Title 18 of the United States Code, and the laws pro-
scribing peonage and involuntary servitude.'
7
Section 242 is aimed at public officers who abuse the constitu-
tional or statutory rights of others. It is made a misdemeanor for
anyone, acting under color of law, willfully to subject any inhabitant
to the deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States or to different punishments, pains or penalties than are
prescribed for the punishment of citizens. The maximum punishment
is a $1000 fine, a year's imprisonment, or both. Section 241 is aimed
at those who combine to interfere with these rights. It is made a felony
for two or more persons to conspire to injure, oppress, or intimidate
any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of
his having exercised the same.'" Punishment is a $5000 fine, ten years'
imprisonment, or both.'9
16. Order of the Attorney General No. 3204, February 3, 1939. The Section
was originally denominated the Civil Liberties Unit. The name was changed in
June 1941, largely to avoid confusion in the public mind with the American Civil
Liberties Union. See CARR, FEDERAL PaOTEcTIONr OF Civn. RIGHTS 24, n. 35 (1947).
17. 18 U.S.C. §§1581(a), 1584 are the most important. In general on these
statutory weapons see CAm, op. cit. supra note 16; Clark, Civil Rights: The Bound-
less Responsibility of Lawyers, 32 A.B.A.J. 453, 454 (1946). The Civil Rights Sec-
tion also handles certain enforcement aspects of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. §§201-219 (1946), the Safety Appliance Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1946), the
Hatch Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 594 et seq. (1948), Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 152
et seq. (1946), and about a dozen other statutes.
18. The section also provides that if two or more persons go in disguise on the
highway, or on the premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free
exercise or enjoyment of any right so secured, they shall be subject to the penalties
provided therein. The "in disguise" language began the section in its original form
and had its origin in "the doings of the Ku Klux [Klan]," United States v. Mosley,
238 U.S. 383, 387 (1915). The clause "has dropped into a subordinate place, and
even there has a somewhat anomalous sound." Id. at 388.
19. In the 1948 revision of Title 18, the clause which had previously appeared,
whereby a conspirator was made ineligible to hold office, was dropped. This rela-
tively minor change is one of the very fev instances in which the recommendations
of the President's Committee on Civil Rights have been adopted by Congress. See
FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT
Upon these statutes, enacted directly after the Civil War, the
Federal Government must rely in combating general deprivations of
civil rights. Their inadequacy has often been stressed."0  Section 242
(the substantive offense) does not by its very terms reach persons
other than those acting under color of law. Where, however, a private
person is involved along with a person in an official status, the former
can be reached indirectly through § 242 by the aiding and abetting
statute 21 or the general conspiracy statute.2  An underlying infirmity
of § 242 as a prosecutive weapon, moreover, is its small calibre.' As
a consequence, some of the most revolting crimes by persons garbed
with State authority are punishable only as misdemeanors under this
statute.2 4 The main difficulty with § 242, however, results from the
great burden imposed upon the Government by the Screws decision
itself, to which further consideration is given below.
In one respect § 242 is superior to its "companion" statute,
§ 241-the conspiracy offense. The former protects inhabitants,
whereas the conspiracy provision is restricted to citizens. 5 Another
limitation upon § 241 is that it cannot be employed to protect a fed-
To SEcURE THESE RIGHTS, op. cit. supra note 15 at 156. The Reviser's notes explain
that "The experience of the Department of Justice is that this unusual penalty has
been an obstacle to successful prosecutions for violations of the Act." NEW TITLE 18,
UNITED STATES CODE 2468 (1948). In very few other instances is this penalty pro-
vided. See Holtzoff, Loss of Civil Rights by Conviction of Crime, 6 FED. PROBATION
18 (No. 2 1942).
20. In a statement announcing the establishment of his Committee on Civil
Rights, President Truman emphasized that "the Federal Government is hampered
by inadequate civil rights statutes." They have been elsewhere described as a "thin
thread" (Address by then Attorney General Clark, 6 NAT. B. J. 1, 5 (1948));"statutory fossils" (Bendiner, Civil Rights-Fresh Start, The Nation, May 10, 1947,
p. 538, col. 1); "a dead letter" (Roberts-Frankfurter-Jackson dissent in Screws
case, 325 U.S. 91, 139 (1945)) ; "feeble remnants" (Eliot, Book Review, 61 HARv. L.
REv. 899, 902 (1948)).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1948). See Rotnem, Clarification of the Civil Rights
Statutes, 2 BILL OF RTs. REv. 252, 259 (1942) ; CAR, op. cit. supra note 16, at 73-74.
As has been noted above, in the first Williams case all defendants except the de-
tective agency head (who was convicted) were acquitted either as principals or
aiders and abettors but were found guilty in a subsequent trial by another jury of
conspiring.
22. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1948). In Culp v. United States, 131 F.2d 93 (8th Cir.
1942) and United States v. Trierweiler, 52 F. Supp. 4 (E.D. Ill. 1943) only the
general conspiracy statute was used.
23. It cannot be denied, however, that the meager penalty of § 242 is a factor
which persuades some juries to convict which, in the presence of a more severe
sanction, might not be inclined to do so. See Caa, op. cit. supra note 16, at 71-72.
24. Screws' conduct was described by Justice Douglas as "a shocking and re-
volting episode in law enforcement." 325 U.S. 91, 92. In Crews v. United States,
160 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1947), the court's opinion begins: "The beautiful Suwanee
River-the mention of which calls to memory a plaintive melody of strumming banjos,
humming bees, childhood's playful hours, a hut among the bushes, and a longing to
go back to the place where the old folks stay-was the scene of the cruel and revolt-
ing crime that provoked the gesture of dealing out justice that is this case." Both
cases involved brutal killings by law enforcement officers.
25. See Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678 (1887).
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erally-secured right as against deprivation by only one person." The
rights heretofore protected under § 241, except for the right of a
qualified voter to participate in a Federal election 7 and to have his
ballot honestly counted,2" have been described as "relatively minor
ones." 29 The scope of the provision will be greatly affected by the
outcome of the Williams conspiracy case. It is the Government's
contention in that case that § 241 is not confined to rights deriving
from national citizenship (despite the fact that § 241 mentions "citi-
zens" and § 242 mentions "inhabitants"). It argues that § 241 also
embraces the great rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment,
the right not to be deprived by State action of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law and the right not to be deprived by such
action of the equal protection of the laws. Judge Sibley in the Wil-
lams conspiracy opinion presents the argument against this conten-
tion, holding that § 241 applies only to rights which derive from
national citizenship.
30
26. A private individual who intimidates a Negro from voting in a primary
election, for example, could presumably not be prosecuted by the Federal Government,
unless the Hatch Act would be held to apply. But cf. United States v. Malphurs,
41 F. Supp. 817 (S.D. Fla. 1941), vacated on other grounds, 316 U.S. 1 (1942).
See, however, Cmam, op. cit. supra note 16, at 178-179.
27. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
28. United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915) (general election); United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) (primary election). The latter case has been
described as "the first important case handled by the Civil Rights Section after its
creation in 1939." CARR, op. cit. supra note 16, at 85.
29. To S~cuRE THESE RIGHTS, op. cit. supra note 15, at 116-117. The point may
be somewhat overstated. The right to be free from slavery and involuntary servi-
tude, except as a punishment for crime, protected in Smith v. United States, 157 Fed.
721 (8th Cir. 1907), cert. denied, 208 U.S. 618 (1908), would not be in the category
of a minor right, nor would the right to hold Federal office, upheld in United States
v. Patrick, 54 Fed. 338 (M.D. Tenn., 1893). Other important rights which were
enunciated, though not upheld on the facts presented, are the right to petition Con-
gress for redress of grievances, see United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552
(1875) ; and right of freedom of the press to comment upon National matters, see
Powe v. United States, 109 F.2d 147, 150 (5th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 679
(1940). Other rights to which the statute has been held applicable include the right
to establish a claim to land under the Homestead Act, United States v. Waddell, 112
U.S. 76 (1884); the right to be protected against unlawful violence while in the
custody of a United States Marshal, Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892) ;
the right to inform an officer of the United States of the violation of Federal law,
Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900), and In re Quarles and Butler, 158
U.S. 532 (1895) ; the right to furnish munitions, ships, and supplies to the Federal
Government for war purposes, Anderson v. United States, 269 Fed. 65 (9th Cir.
1920), cert. denied, 255 U.S. 576 (1921) ; the right to enforce a decree of a Federal
court by contempt proceedings, United States v. Lancaster, 44 Fed. 885 (W.D. Ga.
1890) ; the right to testify in a land title case, Foss v. United States, 266 Fed. 881
(9th Cir. 1920). And of course the implications of several of the foregoing cases
are broader than the holdings on the facts involved. For example, the Waddell case,
supra, is strong authority for the principle that § 241 may be employed in any case
involving deprivation of a right created by Federal statute. But cf. United States v.
Berke Cake Co., 50 F. Supp. 311 (E.D.N.Y. 1943).
30. See 179 F.2d 644 at 647-648. This and other contentions are summarized in
note 10 supra. But see Comment, 57 YALE L. J. 854, 859 (1948) : "* * * The general
statutory 'right' recognized under Section 19 [now Section 241] holds interpretive
possibilities which the courts have merely begun to explore."
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The principal laws dealing with peonage and involuntary servi-
tude, practices which are much more prevalent than is ordinarily sup-
posed,8 make it a crime, punishable by not more than a $5000 fine,
five years in prison, or both, to hold or return any person to a condi-
tion of peonage or to arrest any person with the intent of placing him
in a condition of peonage or, as recently added, to hold or sell a person
into a condition of involuntary servitude.81 These provisions apply
to private persons as well as State officials." Formerly, involuntary
servitude could be effectively prosecuted only where the technical
offense of peonage had been committed, which meant that it was
necessary to prove that the victim was being held to work out a debt.33
But a change made in the 1948 revision of Title 18 of the United
States Code removes at least some of the difficulties which previously
existed. 4 Under the new provision, § 1584, holding a person to a
condition of involuntary servitude is made a crime apart from the
existence of any debt. Although further clarifications are still in
order, 5 this change constitutes a great step forward.
COMPLAINTS, INVESTIGATIONS, AND PROSECUTIONS
The Civil Rights Section is primarily responsible for the enforce-
ment of the foregoing laws. Subject to the overall direction of the
Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General in charge of
the Criminal Division, it determines the general policy to be applied
in the handling of complaints, investigations, and prosecutions. It
indicates to the Federal Bureau of Investigation the nature and extent
of the investigations to be conducted. It prepares and authorizes in-
31. Reliable figures are unavailable. The Civil Rights Section bad approximately
84 complaints of peonage and involuntary servitude during the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1950, and half of these merited investigation. But, chiefly due to the fact
that the victim in this type of case is handicapped by economic circumstances and is
often ignorant, many more violations presumably occur than are ever reported.
31a. 18 U.S.C. §1581(a), §1584 (1948).
32. See Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 218 (1905) ; Bailey v. Alabama,
219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911) ; United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 143 (1914);
Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942) ; United States v. Gaskin, 320 U.S. 527, 528
(1944).
33. As stated in the Clyatt case, supra note 32 at 215, peonage is "a status or
condition of compulsory service, based upon the indebtedness of the peon to the
master. The basal fact is indebtedness."
34. Previously 18 U.S.C. § 51 (1946) had been available, but only where a con-
spiracy was involved, and § 52 had been available, but only where "color of law"
existed. Section 443 was also available but its archaic language presented prosecutive
difficulties. Despite this factor, it was successfully employed in United States v.
Ingalls, 73 F. Supp. 76 (S.D. Calif. 1947) ; United States v. Sabbia (S.D. N.Y. 1907)
(unreported) ; and United States v. Peacher (E.D. Ark. 1937) (unreported). See
Folsom, A Slave Trade Law in a Contemporary Setting, 29 CORNELL L. Q. 203
(1943) ; CAR, op. cit. supra, note 16 at 81-82.
35. For example, an arrest with the intent of placing a person in a condition
of involuntary servitude (a frequent device) does not come under § 1581(a), which
applies only to peonage, nor is it covered by § 1584.
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dictments and guides and advises the United States Attorneys, who,
except in special circumstances, conduct the prosecutions.
For about the first eight years of its existence, all complaints
were referred directly to the Civil Rights Section, which then deter-
mined whether investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
should be conducted. Now, however, the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation may in appropriate cases also conduct preliminary investiga-
tions either upon its own motion or at the request of the United States
Attorney. Full-scale investigations or prosecutive action are not made
without prior clearance through the Civil Rights Section. This re-
striction remains in effect in order to maintain a uniform policy in a
field which is still sui generis. A civil rights case in many areas is a
rarity and even in those jurisdictions where civil rights complaints
occur with relative frequency, the necessity still exists of having a
central agency to insure maintenance of a uniform policy in a delicate
and sometimes highly technical field.
The "complaint" is the beginning of a civil rights case. It may
come from any quarter. As stated by a former Attorney General:
Complaints come not only from the victims and from the
groups organized for the specific purpose of protecting civil lib-
erties, but from fellow townsmen and neighbors of the victims,
and,. in many instances, from local law enforcement officials who
find themselves powerless to deal with the situations which they
report8a
Often complaints, some barely decipherable, are made directly to the
President by the victim or a relative." Since it is realized that the
victim of a civil rights case may often be an ignorant and perhaps
illiterate person,8" particular stress is laid upon attaining a clear under-
standing of the nature of the complaint. "Administrative burial" of a
poorly stated civil rights complaint simply does not occur. Where
insufficient details are presented in the first instance additional in-
formation is elicited by correspondence or, if necessary, through a
direct interview with the victim by the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion. For example, a chain gang prisoner's complaint of generally
36. Biddle, Civil Rights and the Federal Law, in SAFEGUARDING CIV. LIBERTY
TODAY 135 (1945). Also see Rotnem, Enforcement of Civil Rights, 3 NAT. B. J. 1, 8
(1945).
37. The following is typical: ",Dear Mr. Presidnet Truman To whom this mae
consuren I am enforming you of my son who was a prisoner at the City Stokage
[stockade] in , Ga. Dan Smith age 25. So he was beat to death by cop
Tom Sykes and died May the 12th in the city hospital. * * * So Mr. Truman please
due your best for me. You know just how my pore hart feel * * *" [The actual
names of the victim and policeman are altered.]
38. See To SEcuRE THESE RIGHTS, op. cit. supra note 15, at 25.
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bad conditions under which the prisoners were kept (which does not
come within the jurisdiction of the Department) only incidentally
mentioned actual mistreatment at the hands of the guards (which
does). The doubts of the examining attorney were resolved, as is
usually the case, in favor of further inquiry to establish the facts, which
revealed far more extensive beatings than the original complaint had
suggested.
Appraisal of a civil rights complaint by the examining attorney
calls for the exercise of a mature judgment and thorough familiarity
with the scope of the civil rights statutes. Complaints are often re-
ceived which shock the conscience but as to which it is clear that no
person acting under color of law is involved and that no Federal juris-
diction otherwise exists. Many complaints are of the "crackpot"
variety, which can be readily identified as such. So can complaints,
likewise numerous, where only private legal advice is sought. In the
foregoing cases there is no alternative but to close the matter without
investigation.
Investigations, as noted above, may be of a preliminary charac-
ter, in which a limited number of interviews are made, or they may
be full inquiries in which all phases of the case are explored. The
nature of the initial complaint will, of course, be the determining
factor. All investigations are conducted by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and as a general rule by agents who have had special
training or experience in the civil rights field.
Investigations are particularly difficult where law enforcement
officers are the reported offenders, for the FBI, with respect to other
phases of its operations, necessarily must work closely with the local
law enforcement agencies and resentment is sometimes expressed that
investigation should be made of the conduct of a state officer. On the
other hand, other local officers are often the complainants, and they
are as shocked as most other citizens are when the standards of local
law enforcement are debased by resort to brutality. Another factor
which makes conduct of a civil rights investigation more difficult than
that of more routine federal offenses is that the victims and potential
witnesses often, because of fear of further intimidation or reprisal,
withhold information. Frequently prisoners when asked to relate what
they know about a fellow-imnate's beating at the hands of custodial
personnel are reluctant to say anything that might in their view
jeopardize their relationships with the guards. The prospect of "soli-
tary" and revocation of "good time" are often deterrents to frank
disclosure. In involuntary servitude cases, too, fear of reprisal fre-
quently stills the tongues of indigent sharecroppers and makes them
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refrain from revealing acts on the part of the landowner which violate
the peonage or involuntary servitude laws. Only when due account
is taken of these and other factors can the generally high. standards
of the investigative work of the FBI in the civil rights field be properly
evaluated. Increase in the number of agents available for civil rights
investigations and additional specialized training will, if greater ap-
propriations become available, doubtless raise present standards of
investigative work in this field even higher.
Upon completion of the investigation the case is ready for presen-
tation to the Grand Jury if the facts developed are sufficiently strong.
Although violations of § 242 can be presented by information instead
of indictment, it is usually deemed advisable to have a Grand Jury
pass upon the facts of a civil rights case and to prosecute under an
indictment. 9 To some extent the inevitable defense cry of "Washing-
ton interference" in local affairs sounds less convincing where a local
Grand Jury has decided that the facts presented to it warrant prosecu-
tion. However, the Grand Jury's failure to return a true bill in a
case arising under § 242 will not necessarily mean that no prosecutive
action will be taken. Although, generally speaking, failure of the
Grand Jury to indict can be taken as a pretty good indication that a
petit jury would not convict, that is not necessarily so, and in the case
of a flagrant civil rights violation where the facts of the case are par-
ticularly shocking, the Government might not take the Grand Jury's
"No" for an answer." All cases under § 241 and the peonage and
involuntary servitude statutes have to be presented to a Grand Jury
since felonies are involved.
Prosecutions of civil rights cases are usually conducted by the
United States Attorney in whose district the offense was committed.
Throughout the course of the investigation he will have been receiving
the FBI investigative reports along with the Civil Rights Section, and
will have been exchanging views with the Civil Rights Section on the
facts and the law. In special cases a member of the Civil Rights Sec-
tion or of the Criminal Division trial staff will present the case to the
Grand Jury and will handle the prosecution. Wherever possible, how-
ever, civil rights cases are tried by the United States Attorney. As a
member of the community, he is conversant with local customs and
knows the most effective approach to the local jury in this sensitive
39. The policy is not, however, an inflexible one. For example, in United States
v. Erskine (W.D.S.C. 1943) (unreported), the United States Attorney prosecuted
successfully on an information in the first instance.
40. That occurred in the notorious "castor oil" case, and the Government wa&
successful in securing a conviction. Catlette v. United States, 132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir.
1943).
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field.41 His participation also further dilutes the defense argument
about "outside interference." 42
PRIOR PITFALLS AND NEW HORIZONS
Civil rights cases are hard cases to try. It is understandable
that a much lower "batting average" exists in this field than in the case
of more routine Federal criminal prosecutions.43 Often even in a very
strong case, the jury will not convict. Sometimes where a conviction
is secured only a light sentence will be imposed.44 In the South,
where the majority of the cases occur, and where the very words
"civil rights" may make the hackles rise, the defense will seek to
exploit time-worn prejudices.4 5 Though right-minded Southerners
have as little patience as anyone else with the discriminatory conduct
of "village tyrants," 46 there will not infrequently be at least a few
jurors who respond favorably to the familiar shibboleths and it takes
only one juror to cause a mistrial for want of agreement. Also, civil
rights victims, usually members of a minority group, are typically
not the sort who occupy a heroic role in the eyes of the jury; 47 some-
times they are persons who themselves have been caught in the toils
of the law.4"
41. Following the successful outcome of one civil rights case, the United States
Attorney wrote to the Department, "I am sure I was right in the belief that if I did
not personally conduct the trial as a local man and a citizen of the county myself
I could not have expected a conviction."
42. Members of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and others participating in
a civil rights case may be local citizens as well. "It is significant," one commentator
has observed, "that the Judge [in the Screws case], the members of the jury, the
United States Attorney and his staff, the Attorney General's special assistant de-
tailed to help the United States Attorney, and even the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion agents who collected the evidence, were all native Georgians." Coleman,
Freedom From Fear on the Home Front, 29 IowA L. Rxv. 415, 424 (1944).
43. On the average, about 20 civil rights cases are prosecuted a year. Acquittals
and convictions seem to be almost equally divided.
44. For examples see Maslow and Robison, Civil Rights, A Program for the
President's Committee, 7 LAw. GUILD Rmv. 112, 115 (1947). In one of the cases
mentioned there, the Erskine case, local citizens paid the defendant sheriff's fine, their
spokegman stating, "Are we Southerners going to sit idly by while the federal gov-
ernment arrests, prosecutes, fines, and sends to jail our high sheriff?" Anderson
County (S.C.) Independent, December 21, 1943. This type of reaction in recent
years seems to be declining somewhat.
45. See Coleman, op. cit. supra, note 42 at 423.
46. "There are village tyrants as well as village Hampdens, but none who acts
under color of law is beyond the reach of the Constitution." Justice Jackson, in
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). The
phrase is an apt one to describe the oppressor in a civil rights case. See Coleman,
op. cit. supra note 42.
47. See Vanderbilt, 1 BILL OF RIGHTS RE V. 41, 42 (1940); CA R, op. cit. supra
note 16, at 133; Schweinhaut, The Civil Liberties Section of the Department of
Justice, 1 BILL OF RiGHTS REv. 206, 216 (1941) ; Sabine, Preface to SAFEGUARDING
CIVIL LBERTY TODAY (1945).
48. "It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have
frequently been forged in controversies involving not very nice people." Justice
Frankfurter, dissenting, in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950).
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A great obstacle to the successful outcome of a civil rights case
is the burden imposed upon the Government by the Screws case.49
Although a majority of the Court in that case agreed that § 242 is
constitutional, there is no opinion of "the" court,5" and the Court's
rigid interpretation of "willfulness" has enabled some defense attorneys
to persuade the jury that virtually none but a constitutional lawyer
could violate the statute since others would not be capable of possess-
ing the specific intent to deprive the victim of a known constitutional
right. While this reasoning is not justified by the holding of the
Douglas opinion, which states that one who acts in "reckless disre-
gard" of a constitutional requirement acts "willfully" as the Court
interprets the word," there is still language in the opinion which can
make the defense attorney's argument appear persuasive that "all" the
defendant had done was perhaps to violate the State law by assaulting
or killing the victim.5"
The selection of civil rights cases for prosecution is a matter of
basic importance. The fear that the Federal government through the
powers conferred by the Fourteenth Amendment will usurp functions
which are properly those of the State is the underlying motif of the
Roberts-Frankfurter-Jackson dissent in the Screws case. It was
foreshadowed by Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Snowden
v. Hughes.5" There he expressed concern about the doctrine that the
act of every official who purports to wield power conferred by the
State is State action and said that in such a case "every illegal dis-
crimination by a policeman on the beat would be state action for
49. The Screws decision has been the subject of wide comment in legal periodicals.
See, for example, 46 COL. L. Rev. 94 (1946) ; 31 CORNELL L. Q. 48 (1945) ; 8 GA.
BAR J. 320 (1946) ; 40 ILL. LAW REv. 263 (1945) ; 44 MicI. L. REv. 814 (1946) ;
24 ORE. L. REv. 227 (1945); 55 YALE L. J. 576 (1946). The immediate effect of
the decision, as pointed out by Clark, op. cit. supra note 17 at 455, was the defendant's
acquittal upon retrial.
50. "Four separate opinions were rendered; no more than four justices concurred
in any one of them; and one justice, although believing that the conviction should
be affirmed, joined with the four who voted to order a new trial so that it would be
possible for the Court to dispose of the case. * * * The uncertainty caused by the
Court's interpretation of the statute has placed great obstacles in the path of the
federal prosecutor. No matter how heinous is the conduct of the defendant, it is not
easy to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted for the purpose of denying the
victim a federally-secured right." Clark, A Federal Prosecutor Looks at the Civil
Rights Statutes, 47 COL. L. REv. 175, 182-183 (1947). See, also, Fraenkel, The
Function of the Lower Federal Courts as Protectors of Civil Liberties, 13 LAW AND
CoNTEMP. PRoB. 132, 142 (1948).
51. 325 U.S. 91, 105.
52. "In effect, the position [of the defendants] urges it is murder they have done,
not deprivation of constitutional right. Strange as the argument is the reason. It
comes to this, that abuse of state power creates immunity to federal power. * * * The
defense is not pretty. Nor is it valid." Rutledge, J., in Screws case, 325 U.S. 91, 114
(1945).
53. 321 U.S. 1, 16 (1944).
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purpose of suit in a federal court." 5' But the fact remains that every
such discrimination by the policeman on the beat is State action,
though it does not follow in a civil rights case, any more than it does
in any other kind of case, that the Government's discretion will be
abused by prosecution for every peccadillo. The Civil Rights Section,
moreover, has consistently followed the policy of refraining from
prosecution under the civil rights statutes if effective local action is
taken against the offenders under applicable State law. 5
Aside from the foregoing policy, there is the usual consideration
of strength of proof, which is present in any criminal case. Although
beneficial results frequently accrue even if the Government is unable
to secure a conviction in a civil rights case, the evidence to warrant
prosecution must be sufficiently strong to offer at least a fair chance
of conviction in the face of the local prejudice which often exists.
Though emphasis has been laid in the foregoing discussion upon
the prosecutive aspect of the civil rights program, the Civil Rights
Section often stresses the mediative approach as no less important.
The President's Civil Rights Committee has formally recommended
resort to educational and mediation efforts in an effort to forestall
chronic incidents of police brutality or persistent interferences with
the right to vote.56 Such techniques are used where appropriate and
United States Attorneys have often reported favorably upon the out-
come of conferences with persons who have been in violation of the
civil rights laws but where the facts did not support prosecutive action.
54. As pointed out in the Government's brief in the Supreme Court in the
Screws case with respect to such apprehension, "Similar fears were expressed-
unjustifiedly, as the subsequent history of the statute shows-when Section 2 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 was being debated. Senator Garrett Davis of Kentucky
said (Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 598) that 'this short bill repeals all the
penal laws of the States. * * * The cases of offense and misdemeanor that in these
respects the honorable Senator's bill would bring up every day in the United States
would be as numerous as the passing minutes. The result would be to utterly sub-
vert our Government; it would be wholly incompatible with its principles, with its
provisions, or with its spirit.'" Pp. 45-46 Gov't. Br. Similar fears were expressed
when the operation of the Fourteenth Amendment was being considered in Congress.
See The Single Arbitrary Act of a State Official Directed Against a Single Ildi-
vidual, as a Violation of the Fourteenth Anzendinent, (Note) 36 HAnv. L. REv. 1020,
1025 n.24 (1923).
55. An interesting discussion of the problem of prosecutive policy where an
offense violates both Federal and State law, which is of such peculiar importance in
the civil rights field, is to be found in Professor Schwartz' article, Federal Criminal
Jurisdiction and Prosecutors Discretion, 13 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 64 (1948).
He points out, at 76, that the arguments in the Screws case "evoked one of the in-
frequent official disclosures of the role of the prosecutor's discretion in the distribu-
tion of criminal business between federal and state courts." He suggests that the
Attorney General formally articulate the criteria which guide him in exercising his
discretion not only in civil rights cases but in all offenses against "auxiliary" federal
criminal laws. This is a laudable and perhaps attainable objective, though, as has
been pointed out by a former Attorney General, " * * The growth of our law is not
exclusively or perhaps chiefly logical, particularly where considerations of federal
and state authority and jurisdiction are involved. The imponderables of balance and
degree play a part." Biddle, op. cit. supra note 36, at 142.
56. To SECuRE THESE RIGHTS, op. cit. supra note 15, at 152.
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Another highly important aspect of the Government's civil rights
program, also recommended by the President's Civil Rights Com-
mittee, is its participation as amicus curiae in cases which involve
important civil rights issues. The participation by the Department
of Justice in the Racial Restrictive Covenant cases 57 both through
filing a brief as amicus curiae and by the oral argument of the Solicitor
General, constituted the first instance in which the Government has
participated in a case to which it was not a party and where its sole
purpose was the vindication of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights."'
Much has been accomplished by the Civil Rights Section in the
relatively short period of its existence. But much more will have to
be done before the "pervasive gap" 5 between democratic aims and
non-democratic practices is finally closed. It is clear that additional
legislation is essential to the attainment of this goal. A general civil
rights bill 0 has been introduced in Congress by former Senator (now
Attorney General) McGrath and Congressman Celler. Its enactment
would in large measure obviate the difficulties discussed above and
would, moreover, accord protection of individual rights its proper
place in our government.
This bill would strengthen § 241 considerably by including within
its coverage action by a single individual and would provide a civil
remedy in such a case."' The present provision would also be ex-
panded by bringing inhabitants generally within the ambit of the
protection of the section, which as has been noted is now confined to
citizens.
The penalties of § 242, which otherwise remains unchanged in
the bill, would be greatly increased where a civil rights deprivation
by one acting under color of law results in the death or maiming of the
victim. To remove the difficulties which are imposed by the Screws
requirement that a specific intent to deprive the victim of a constitu-
tional right is necessary and that a generally "bad" purpose on the
part of the defendant will not satisfy the requirement of "willfulness,"
57. Shelley v. Kraemer and McGhee v. Sipes, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) ; Hurd v. Hodge
and Urciolo v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
58. Other cases involving civil rights issues in which the Solicitor General has
filed briefs as amicus curiae are: Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S.
410 (1948) ; McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Board of Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) ;
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). The Civil Rights Section has prepared briefs
as amicus curiae in two cases involving the voting rights of reservation Indians in
New Mexico and Arizona, Trujillo v. Garley, Civil No. 1353, D.C., N.M., Aug. 11,
1948 (not reported) ; Harrison v. Laveen, 67 Ariz. 337, 196 P.2d 456 (1948).
59. To SEcuRE THESE RIGHTS, Op. cit. supra note 15, at 139.
60. S. 1725, H.R. 4682, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
61. 8 U.S.C. § 47 (1946) already provides a civil remedy in the case of con-
spiracies.
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a new section is proposed which contains a partial enumeration of
specific rights to which the provision applies, each of which has been
enunciated by the courts."2
Certain clarifying changes in the provisions relating to involun-
tary servitude and peonage are also made in the bill, though as previ-
ously noted the 1948 revision of Title 18 has effected substantial
improvement. The bill could be further strengthened by inclusion of
a provision applicable to the practice of arresting a person with the
intent of placing him in a condition of involuntary servitude not tanta-
mount to peonage.63
Amendment of the Hatch Act 04 to make that statute clearly ap-
plicable to the intimidation and coercion of voters in primary as well
as general elections is also part of the bill. The proposed legislation
contains additional features for the protection of the right to political
participation, one of the most important of which is the creation of
civil remedies which the Attorney General can invoke to forestall
threatened denials of the right to vote. Thus for the first time in the
civil rights field resort by the Government to civil sanctions would be
provided."
The bill also contains provisions prohibiting discrimination or
segregation in interstate transportation, violations of which are made
subject to fine and civil suit."0
In addition to the foregoing and other provisions designed to
strengthen protection of the individual's rights, the bill would greatly
improve the machinery of the Federal Government for the protection
of civil rights by according divisional status to the Civil Rights Sec-
tion within the Department of Justice and commensurate expansion
within the Federal Bureau of Investigation for work in the civil rights
field. It would also create a Commission on Civil Rights to assimilate
information, appraise policies and make recommendations in civil
rights matters, for which virtually no facilities presently exist within
the Government. Creation of a Joint Congressional Committee on
Civil Rights is also contemplated.
62. The proposed section is carefully worded to avoid confinement of its applica-
tion to the rights listed. But an additional safeguard to forestall defense resort to
the inevitable argument that inclusio unius est exchsio alterius would seem desirable
and a "catch-all," based upon the language of the Screws decision is suggested:
"Any other right which shall have been made specific either by the express terms of
the Constitution or laws of the United States or by decisions interpreting them."
63. See note 35, supra.
64. 18 U.S.C. §594 (1948).
65. The importance of the availability to the Government of civil remedies in
civil rights matters was stressed by the first Chief of the Civil Rights Section. See
Schweinhaut, op. cit. supra note 47, at 216.
66. See Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950) ; Morgan v. Virginia,
328 U.S. 373 (1946); Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948);
Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941).
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Other bills introduced in conjunction with the so-called "omnibus
civil rights bill" outlined above were an anti-lynching bill,'" an anti-
poll tax bill 68 and a Fair Employment Practice bill.69
The proposed measures embody most of the legislative recom-
mendations of the President's Civil Rights Committee. Though the
report of that Committee was issued three years ago, virtually no
action has been taken by Congress to give effect to the proposals. The
safeguarding of the rights of the individual requires no justification
beyond the moral principles upon which it is predicated. But our
obligations as a member of the United Nations and the compelling
need to demonstrate our ability in the face of communist challenge to
do all in our power to make the individual secure against oppression,
import additional urgency to the enactment of a really effective civil
rights program.*
67. S. 1726, H.R. 4683, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. Several other bills are also pending.
68. S. 1727, H.R. 3199, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
69. S. 1728, H.R. 4453, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
* This article was completed in December, 1950.
